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RETENTION OF INDEXICAL BELIEF AND
THE NOTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY
B D Z
A widely accepted view in the discussion of personal identity is that the notion of psychological
continuity expresses a one–many or many–one relation. This belief is unfounded. A notion of
psychological continuity expresses a one–many or many–one relation only if it includes, as a
constituent, psychological properties whose relation with their bearers is one–many or many–one; but
the relation between an indexical psychological state and its bearer when first tokened is not a
one–many or many–one relation. It follows that not all types of psychological continuity may take
a one–many or many–one form. This conclusion casts doubt on the Lockean approach to the issue,
by showing that the notion of psychological continuity Lockeans rely on may not be available.
I. INTRODUCTION
Here are three propositions:
. The identity thesis: identity (including personal identity) is a one–one
relation
. The Lockean claim: personal identity consists of some type of psycho-
logical continuity
. The continuity thesis: psychological continuity is a one–many or
many–one relation.
On the face of it, and barring substantial unpacking or interpretation, it
seems that one cannot consistently hold all three theses at the same time.
For supposing that identity is a one–one relation and the continuity thesis ()
is true, the Lockean claim () must be false, since it identifies a one–one
relation with something that is one–many or many–one in nature. On the
other hand, if the Lockean claim is true, then the continuity thesis must be
false, since the Lockean claim is supposed to be a claim about personal
identity, which is one–one by the identity thesis (). Finally, if the continuity
thesis () and the identity thesis () are both true, the Lockean claim () is
false, since it is impossible for the same relation to be both one–one and
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one–many. It thus appears that one or more of the trio must be abandoned,
or something else must be added, if the inconsistency is to go away.
It is not too far from the truth to say that most if not all of the major
positions that have emerged in the area of personal identity in the past sixty
years or so are largely the result of various attempts to try to square the ap-
parent inconsistency of the three theses, and these efforts fall broadly into
two categories, which may be dubbed ‘preservationist’ and ‘eliminativist’. In
the preservationist category one finds views such as the so-called ‘psycho-
logical continuity view’ (advocated chiefly by Sydney Shoemaker) and the
‘multiple occupancy theory’ (championed by David Lewis and his fellow
four-dimensionalists).1 The continuity view holds that the tension among
the three propositions is resolved by adopting the stipulation that only non-
branching psychological continuity is person-preserving. Multiple occup-
ancy theorists, on the other hand, try to show that there is no inconsistency
by adding a fourth thesis, that persons perdure rather than endure. More
specifically, on this view, if persons do not exist in their entirety at each
temporal point during which they exist, then there is a good explanation
of why the identity thesis and the continuity thesis might both be true:
wherever you have an n-line branching (or fusing) of psychological life, you
have n temporal phases of n persons. To put this differently, one sees incon-
sistency between () and () only because one thinks that persons have spatial
location but no temporal parts, a claim which four-dimensionalists reject.
Not all theorists, however, are keen on preserving all three theses. Those
who do not are the eliminativists. The so-called ‘animalists’ are one party in
this camp: they reject the Lockean claim () outright, while remaining non-
committal in regard to the other theses, or treating the truth or falsity of
these theses as neutral on the personal identity issue. (To be fair to the
animalists, their position on the issue of personal identity does not require
them to take a stance on the truth of the other two claims.) Reductionists are
also unsympathetic about saving all three theses. In their view, the Lockean
claim is a claim about a non-issue, because the idea of a person, on this
view, is merely the result of a language practice featuring a word that has no
metaphysical foundation. They are also of the opinion that the identity
thesis is probably true, but is irrelevant. The reductionists do, however, have
a reason for preserving the continuity thesis (), although their reason is
quite different from that of the Lockean. They believe that the significance
of the continuity thesis has to do with the notion of what matters in survival,
not the notion of identity.
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So far I have mentioned only two approaches towards the three theses
and a few examples of each. Enumerating all the views currently debated in
the area, however, is not the aim of this paper. My plan is rather to draw the
reader’s attention to a curious fact about the recent debate about personal
identity: of all the parties who have attempted to resolve the apparent incon-
sistency, none has chosen to question the truth of the continuity thesis ().
This is both surprising and puzzling. It is no surprise that there is no
shortage of attacks on thesis (), for as long as there have been Lockeans,
there have been anti-Lockeans. It is also understandable why some would
question the identity thesis (), both in regard to its claimed truth and to its
relevance to personal identity. For example, Derek Parfit and his fellow
reductionists have argued that the identity thesis is just irrelevant to the issue
of personal identity. But even the preservationists and the eliminativists did
not go so far as to question the truth of the continuity thesis.
However, the privileged status which has been given to the continuity
thesis is undeserved, and the time has come to give it some serious exam-
ination. As far as I know, Bernard William’s article ‘Personal Identity and
Individuation’ was the first to give a clear presentation of the continuity
thesis, and by doing so ushered in the contemporary phase in the debate
about personal identity.2 The history of the continuity thesis is a very inter-
esting one; certainly the doctrine can be traced back to as early as, not
surprisingly, John Locke himself, and it might well have been a key assump-
tion of his view on personal identity (referred to here as the Lockean claim).
But the continuity thesis remained mostly implicit after Locke, and it did not
assume a pivotal role in the debate until the publication of Williams’ classic.
This is not to deny the significance of the role played by David Wiggins’
writings on the topic, which employed the notion of amoeba-style fission,
the notion which did most to popularize and shape the doctrine.
I am of the view that the continuity thesis is a deeply suspicious philo-
sophical doctrine. I also believe that further progress in this area depends on
getting clear about this doctrine, which has held sway over the minds of too
many philosophers for too long.
I have developed elsewhere two lines of argument against the continuity
thesis;3 in one, I show that physical discontinuity leads to fundamental
change in the character of the first person; in the other, I argue that no
current theories of direct reference would support the belief that there could
 DESHENG ZONG
©  The Author    Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
2 B. Williams, ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, in his Problems of the Self (Cambridge
UP, ), pp. –.
3 Presumably there should be references here 
to two publications
by the author, removed in the draft for the sake of anonymity?
be continuity of indexical thoughts when there is bodily discontinuity. The
purpose of the current paper is to provide a third line of argument, also
based on indexical thought, against the continuity thesis. Together these
three arguments constitute a strong case against the continuity thesis.
The argument I develop in this paper may be summed up as follows.
There are psychological capacities that are directly in the business of reten-
tion of indexical belief, and there are psychological capacities whose normal
functioning relies on the availability of such beliefs. But physical discontinu-
ity of any form tends to undermine or disrupt these psychological capacities
in their belief retention function. To put this slightly differently, there is at
least one type of psychological property, namely, psychological states with
indexical content, for which a one–many or many–one relation between the
states and their bearers is not possible.
This conclusion casts strong doubt on the plausibility of the continuity
thesis, and by so doing, undermines the Lockean claim. Clearly, the Lockean
claim and the continuity thesis are different claims, but the Lockean claim
assumes the continuity thesis. For suppose the continuity thesis is false (in
other words, suppose not all forms of psychological continuity may take a
one–many or many–one form). It follows that there could be forms of
psychological continuity which are by nature one–one (that is, requiring
physical continuity). Barring further argument or further assumptions, the
Lockean thesis cannot rule out the possibility that the type of psychological
continuity it takes personal identity to consist in is not of the one–one type.
A Lockean who cannot rule this out is in no position to claim that this
theory of personal identity is different from one which takes it to consist in
physical continuity. This shows that a commitment to the truth of the
continuity thesis is an essential part of the Lockean claim.
This commitment is also its downfall if it can be shown that at least one
particular type of psychological continuity which the Lockean must admit is
of the one–one type. In §§III–V I shall show that any replacement of a
normal psychological capacity responsible for retention of indexical belief
with a psychological quasi-capacity causes discontinuity of this kind of
belief. I shall conclude by pointing out the extent of the damage this finding
is likely to have on the Lockean view of personal identity.
II. THE B-RELATION AND THE CONTINUITY THESIS
Psychological continuity is a relation. But nothing can be psychologically
continuous with anything, including itself, just like that and not in virtue of
something else. In other words, psychological continuity is a relation made
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up of other things, more specifically, particular relations between psycho-
logical properties (states, events, processes, etc.) and their bearers (the
physical systems which embody them), such as the relations between ami-
ability and the amiable person, belief and the believer, intention and the
person intending, pain and the person in pain, and so forth.
Most agree that if an animal possesses any psychological property, it must
have other psychological properties as well. It is, after all, highly unlikely
that an animal would come equipped with just one single psychological
property but no others. For example, it is unlikely that there could be an
animal equipped with the cognitive capacity of belief but not a capacity
which makes use of the belief. This is not a fact about psychological pro-
perties themselves but one about the nature of creatures that have them.
I shall call the relation between a psychological property and its bearer
the ‘B-relation’ (short for ‘bearer relation’). What is the nature of the
B-relation? Given the multiplicity requirement (as I shall call it), it is quite
possible that not all B-relations take a one–many form. Furthermore,
whether a psychological property is capable of standing in a B-relation only
to the original bearer or to more than one bearer is a matter to be
determined by the nature of the property and the conditions required if a
creature is to have it.
What this means is that a conclusion about the nature of the B-relation in
one case should not be taken in itself as a sufficient ground for its application
to another case. The point is easily appreciated in the case of psychological
properties belonging to different categories, e.g., personality traits and
qualitative experiential states, states with a mind-to-world direction of fit
and states with a world-to-mind direction of fit, states with descriptive
content and states featuring indexical content, and so on. The same is true
of psychological properties within certain general categories, such as beliefs.
Although both ‘All politicians are crooks’ and ‘That man over there is a
crook’ are both beliefs, the two are quite different. The former is descriptive
and the latter indexical; one has a satisfaction type of truth-condition, the
other a de re one.4 There is also a difference between the conditions required
of creatures who can be said to have them. While anything that possesses
the general concepts which make up the descriptive belief is in a position to
have the general belief, only those that stand in a de re relation to the object
of the belief can have the indexical belief.
Notwithstanding the complexity of the situation regarding the B-relation,
philosophers participating in the debate about personal identity in recent
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decades write as if psychological states are all the same when it comes to the
B-relation. In particular, they seem to think that all psychological properties,
from dispositions such as personality and faculties such as perception and
memory to individual psychological states with intentional content, are such
that their B-relation with their bearer may always take a one–many or
many–one form. These beliefs are certainly unsupported. The time has
come for a more serious look at these popular beliefs than they have
received so far.
III. PERCEPTION, QUASI-PERCEPTION AND
RETENTION OF INDEXICAL BELIEFS
If I can perceive an object, I am in a position to form a demonstrative con-
cept of it. If I have a demonstrative concept of the object, I am in a position
to form an indexical belief about it. Thus if I can see a bird, I am in a
position to form the belief ‘That bird is F’; if I am hearing the sound of
a bugle, I can form the belief ‘That bugle sound is G’.
But perception does more than constitute a ground for acquisition of
indexical beliefs: it also constitutes a ground for the retention of such beliefs.
To continue the examples given above, if I noticed the bird at time t1, and
formed the belief ‘That bird is F’ on that basis, then assuming I kept the bird
in view from t1 to t2, I must be said to have retained the belief in that time
frame, and would be justified if I said that I did.5 This simple fact about the
formation and retention of indexical belief in the case of perception has
implications for the issue of psychological continuity. Any period in the life
of a creature must be such that if the creature is able to form on a per-
ceptual basis an indexical belief at the beginning of the period and retain it
on the same ground until the end of that period, the creature’s life in that
period is psychologically related as far as that indexical belief is concerned.
This is of course what happens in the case of normal perception, but I
shall now introduce the notion of quasi-perception, henceforth, for short,
‘q-perception’: S q-perceives o if () o exists; () S has the experience of
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seemingly perceiving o; () S ’s experience of seemingly perceiving o is caused
by the interaction between a person T (who may or may not be S ) and o;
() S is either unaware of this particular feature of the experience, or is
aware of it, but is unable to tell whether S and T are identical, or to identify
demonstratively the o responsible for the apparent experience of seeing o.
To illustrate q-perception, suppose devices are set up in the heads of two
persons S and T such that every time the auditory apparatus of T is directly
stimulated by information from an object o, S undergoes the experience of
seemingly hearing a certain type of sound. Let o be the sound of a bugle
being played somewhere near T that activates T ’s auditory apparatus and
leads to S ’s seemingly hearing the sound of a bugle. It is easy to see that
q-perception does not for S constitute a ground for the formation of an
indexical belief. This is because q-perception as defined above really comes
down to three things: the having of some subjective experience, the exist-
ence of some object (process, event, etc.), and the lack in q-perceivers of
knowledge about or of ability to identify the subject whose perceptual ap-
paratus functions as the mediating cause between the object and the
experience. Given this, it is hard to see how q-perceivers can form indexical
beliefs based on their q-perceptions alone. If S is to have a belief of the form
‘This F is G’, S must have a demonstrative concept of ‘this F’. But part of
having a demonstrative concept of an object is that one has the ability to
point out the object or to locate it, or knows how to approach it if one has
to. But this is exactly something which a creature equipped only with
q-perception cannot do.
But the reason why q-perception has to be rejected as a ground for the
formation of indexical beliefs is also a ground for rejecting it as a basis for
retention of such beliefs. For example, suppose S first forms an indexical
belief based on normal perception at t1 (say, ‘That bugle sound is F’), but
then is made to undergo at t2 a process whereby the perception is replaced
by q-perception. Through q-perception, and whatever are the intermediate
steps through which the perceptual information is q-delivered to S, the
sound source keeps generating in S the experience of seemingly hearing
the continuous playing of a bugle. This whole affair lasts until t3, when the
causal link between the sound source and the experience is cut off. In a case
like this, we must say that the belief discontinued at t2; it discontinued be-
cause S lost the ability to identify the object demonstratively, either because
S is unaware of the now q-nature of the perception, or is unable to locate the
sound source. It discontinued because S could not tell if the conscious
experience was due to the direct activation of S ’s own auditory apparatus by
the sound, or by the effect on the auditory apparatus of someone else who
was at or near the source of the sound. (The continuity thesis requires that
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the notion of q-perception, and that of q-memory as well, are conceptually
coherent; thus doubt about these cannot be used to undermine my argu-
ments in this and the next section.)
What I have shown is that the retention of indexical beliefs through
perception is possible only as long as the bearer of the perceptual ability
responsible for the formation of an indexical belief is the bearer of the same
perceptual ability as kept track of the perceptual object until a later time.
Retention of indexical beliefs cannot tolerate physical discontinuity in
bearers. In other words, the B-relation in the case of indexical beliefs formed
and retained on perceptual basis can only take a one–one form.
IV. MEMORY, Q-MEMORY AND
RETENTION OF INDEXICAL BELIEFS
The ability to keep track perceptually of an object about which one has an
indexical belief is but one of several ways we have for the retention of such
beliefs. But belief retention by perceptually keeping track of the object has
its limitations. When objects have moved, or moved away, or when we have
moved, they become perceptually inaccessible. Through perceptually losing
the objects, we lose the beliefs themselves. This is where memory becomes
handy. Memory makes it possible to retain indexical information, including
information in the form of an indexical belief, even when the source of
the information is no longer perceptually accessible, and there can be little
doubt that accessing indexical information off-line in this way is hugely
beneficial to an animal. How memory achieves this is a subject beyond the
scope of this paper; to make the discussion in this section more manageable,
I shall focus only on memory’s role in the retention of a proper part of an
indexical belief, i.e., the demonstrative idea of the object of the belief.
What conditions are required to retain a demonstrative idea depend on
what a demonstrative idea is. If to have a demonstrative idea is to have an
ability to do a certain type of thing (as most writers on this subject agree),
then to say that one has retained a demonstrative idea is at least to say that
one has retained that ability. I shall call this ‘the ability condition’. But a
concept is also an entity with a content, and this suggests that content
preservation constitutes a second condition for retention of demonstrative
concepts. I shall refer to this as ‘the content condition’. Perhaps more
is required for concept retention, but for my purposes these two conditions
will do.
The content condition requires that if I can be said to have retained a
demonstrative idea formed at an earlier time on perceptual basis, I should
INDEXICAL BELIEF AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY 
©  The Author    Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
be able, on the basis of memory, to entertain thoughts featuring egocentric
spatial contents inherited from the perception which caused the memory.
For example, if I have a current demonstrative idea of ‘that Russian’
because I am only a few feet away from him and see him, I am in a position
to entertain thoughts about his spatial location relative to me, such as ‘He is
sitting over there’, ‘He has just moved to my left’, and so forth. Likewise,
if I can be said to have retained the demonstrative idea of ‘that Russian’,
I should be able to entertain thoughts such as ‘That Russian was sitting only
a few feet away from me’, ‘He was standing to my left’, and so on. Lack of
ability to entertain thoughts of this type would strongly suggest that I met no
Russians last night, or the encounter left no recollection whatsoever, or all
memories of that Russian have been completely lost. In none of the three
scenarios can I be said to have satisfied the content condition.
The ability condition suggests that if I can be said to have retained a
demonstrative idea of something which I had encountered at some earlier
time, then I must have retained all or part of the ability to perform certain
tasks. What specific type of task? John Perry (in ‘Rip van Winkle’) mentions
recognition, inference and communication, among others. More illumina-
ting for my purposes is an ability Gibsonians believe defines perception,
namely, the ‘affordance’ of a perceived object or situation.6 On this theory,
to perceive a ditch, for example, is to perceive its can/cannot-be-jumped-
over-ness by me, the perceiver; to perceive some weights in the gym is to
perceive their too/not too-heavy-for-me-to-lift-ness, and so forth. Applied
to retention of demonstrative ideas, this suggests that one has retained a
demonstrative idea of an object only if one has retained the affordance
of the object picked up at the time of perception. I can be said to have
retained the demonstrative idea of ‘That ditch’ only if I exhibit a readiness
to jump over the ditch when the situation calls for jumping it.
What happens to the formation and the retention of these concepts when
memory is replaced by q-memory? Certainly the issue of concept formation
on the basis of q-memory is one worth exploring, but in what follows I shall
only focus on the role of q-memory in belief retention and I shall not discuss
its role in belief formation, mainly for two reasons. First, whether q-memory
can be a legitimate ground for new beliefs is a subject in its own right and
cannot be dealt with here; secondly, if q-memory can be shown to constitute
a ground for formation of new indexical beliefs and their retention, this
would only reveal in terms of psychological continuity something about the
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relation between the periods of the individual after fission, not about periods
that sit across fission, which is what concerns me here. Following standard
practice, I shall say that S q-remembers some event e if () S has an apparent
memory of experiencing e; () there is someone X who experienced e (X may
or may not be identical with S ); () X ’s experiencing e is causally responsible
for S ’s having the apparent memory; and () S is either unaware of the
q-nature of the memory, in which case the memory is a weak q-memory, or
is aware of it, in the same sense as that in which people ‘remember’ what
has been told them by others about what happened in the past, in which
case the memory is a strong q-memory.7 If q-memory is really genuine
memory (and only differs from the latter in some inessential aspect), then
like memory, it should constitute a ground for the retention of demonstra-
tive ideas. But does it? To answer this question, I need to consider weak and
strong q-memory separately.
The problems facing the weak q-rememberer are two-fold. First, as I said
earlier, someone who has a demonstrative idea of an object on a perceptual
basis is someone who can entertain thoughts featuring egocentric spatial
content inherent to perception. Correspondingly, if I can be said to have
retained a demonstrative idea of an object from an earlier perceptual
encounter with the object, I should be able to entertain thoughts with this
content. But given this status, the weak q-rememberer is in no position to
think the egocentric content which the q-memory has inherited from the
perception. Suppose a weak q-rememberer S makes a self-ascription of
something S apparently remembers, say, ‘I remember that he moved to my
left at one point during the party’. If this turns out to be a piece of
q-memory, the ‘I’ and ‘my’ have different meanings. But S is none the less
disposed not only to have such thoughts, but also to take the egocentric
content to be self-directed and not about someone else. But q-rememberers
are in no position to think such thoughts or to make such self-ascriptions,
because of their ignorance about the identity mix-up in their thoughts. So S
fails to meet the content condition.
Weak q-rememberers also fail to meet the ability condition. For example,
the sighting of a certain weight by an average man in the gym may be a
perception of lack of affordance, but it can be a perception of affordance in
the case of an unusually strong man. What this means is that if the two men
have each formed a demonstrative idea which they would express by ‘those
weights over there’, the ideas are likely to be associated with different
behavioural tendencies. For suppose the weaker man had unwittingly
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inherited the memory of the stronger man. If he sees the weights the other
man had worked with before, it would be natural for him to feel comfortable
with the idea of ‘go and give them a lift’. But if he does this, he is in for a big
surprise – an indication of his failure to meet the ability condition. Strong
q-rememberers face a different set of difficulties, the first having to do with
their knowledge that not everything they seem to remember is memory.
Being aware of that, strong q-rememberers realize that they cannot take at
face value everything they can apparently remember ‘from the inside’, and
will try to sort things out (if they are rational). It is clear however, that in
trying to sort things out they cannot just rely on what they can remember
‘from the inside’, for as far as what they can remember from the inside goes,
everything is the same. More is needed if they are to succeed. Moreover,
given the situation, it seems that help could only come from third-person
testimonial evidence. Suppose a strong q-rememberer S succeeds in the task
and can now tell which apparent memories are memories and which are
q-memories. However, to be able to tell memories from q-memories is one
thing, to have the ability to retain demonstrative ideas on a q-memory basis
is quite another. The relation between the person who has a demonstrative
idea of an object and the object of which it is a concept is supposed to be
direct and unmediated (e.g., the relation between the dog at my feet and my
concept of ‘This dog’, while pointing at it, is an example of unmediated
relation); but the relation between me and an object someone has just told
me about is not unmediated. This shows that knowledge that one is a
q-rememberer (plus what one can apparently remember ‘from the inside’)
constitutes no grounds for retention of demonstrative ideas.
Furthermore, even if we assume that there are means by which strong
q-rememberers can sort out the mess in their memories, all this shows is
that since they can now distinguish what they remember from what they
q-remember, they are in a position to avoid the kind of errors to which
weak q-rememberers are prone, namely, taking what they q-remember as a
reason for their continued use of certain demonstrative concepts. In other
words, if strong q-rememberers manage to satisfy the two conditions for
retention of demonstrative ideas, this is because they make claims about
concept retention only on the basis of what they remember, not what they
q-remember.
The formation of indexical beliefs and their subsequent retention con-
stitute one form of psychological connectedness capable of linking periods of
one’s mental life into one continuous whole, regardless of how significant the
continuity might be. What I have just shown is that when memory is
replaced by either weak q-memory or strong q-memory, this particular form
of psychological continuity between pre-fission and post-fission periods
 DESHENG ZONG
©  The Author    Journal compilation ©  The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly
is bound to be lost. The implication of this conclusion for the continuity
thesis could not be clearer. If the relation between indexical beliefs and
their bearer is to take a one–many or many–one form, q-memory must be
capable of effecting post-fission retention of demonstrative ideas formed
before fission; but I have shown that this is something q-memory cannot do.
V. INFORMATION CONSUMPTION, Q-STATES AND
RETENTION OF INDEXICAL BELIEF
The two bases of belief retention discussed so far are two capacities directly
in the business of information acquisition and retention. These capacities
acquire and/or retain information directly received from the environment.
Investigation of the issue of belief retention will not be complete, however,
until psychological processes whose proper functions are information
consumption are examined as well. First, it is the requirement of rationality
that information collected and stored by an organism is put to use, i.e.,
serves the aims and purposes of the organism. In any case, animals equipped
with information collecting adaptations are typically equipped with psycho-
logical processes whose normal functioning makes use of information it has
acquired and retained, including, in the case of humans, information in the
form of indexical beliefs. It is not unreasonable to assume that if an indexical
belief is being used or has been successfully deployed by an information-
consuming psychological process, this results in the retention of the belief
(depending on the case, the period of retention may vary).
But there is a second reason why we need to look at psychological
processes that are mainly in the business of information consumption. We
need to look at the issue of what impact the failure to retain indexical beliefs
has on the psychological life of the animal whose beliefs they are. Two
action-related faculties are desires and plans. Many of our desires and plans
are formed on the basis of indexical beliefs, and the tenacity of the desires
and plans – in particular, their satisfaction – typically contributes to reten-
tion of the belief that first leads to their formation. Thus if I am struck by the
thought ‘There is not much hair here!’ while examining my own crown in
the mirror, and the chill which this sends down my spine leads to a desire to
prevent the hair loss, this may lead to the adoption of a plan to buy hair-
growth products. It is not the proper job of desires and plans to retain
indexical beliefs, but since the normal functioning of these two faculties
typically makes use of indexical beliefs, they indirectly contribute to the
longer life-span of these beliefs, typically through making the beliefs their
very informational basis. 
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One example of cognition-related psychological capacities is file integra-
tion. I met a man at a party, we shook hands, and I said to myself ‘This man
has very sweaty hands’. Later I learn that the man I shook hands with was
Mr X, and so I now know that Mr X has sweaty hands. But there is no
reason to expect that once I gained this piece of knowledge (that Mr X has
sweaty hands), my memory of that man as I met him on the occasion
wherein the belief was formed would disappear. In fact, information in-
tegrated into a more general context often strengthens rather than weakens
the memory of it.
What happens to an indexical belief when a normal psychological
capacity whose proper functioning relies on indexical facts (or information)
is replaced with a q-capacity? What, for example, would happen to my
desire to have more hair when I undergo fission and the fission offshoots
wake up to a hairy head? It seems that the whole matter would depend on
whether the content of the psychological state generated by the quasi
psychological capacity in question – the content of psychological states
which fission offshoots inherit from their fission ancestor – makes sense to
the fission offshoots as they find themselves.
In the case of the action-based faculties, for example, if a hairy fission
offshoot is unaware of the fission that resulted in his creation, he would find
his having a desire for more hair puzzling, since he knows that he has to be
blind not to know that he is as hairy as a man could ever want to be; this
would leave him with no choice but reject the inherited belief ‘I am losing
hair’ as untrue. But if the belief goes, so does the desire to have more hair
(unless he is irrational); and if both the indexical belief and the desire based
on it are gone, there is no reason to continue to pursue hair-growth related
intentions or plans. There is no need to keep that appointment with the hair
specialist, to buy that particular product one had planned to buy, etc. But
the problem does not stop here, for if the indexical belief is rejected as
untrue and the related desires and plans are dismissed as irrational, there is
no need for the mind to continue to invest in the memory resources used for
hair-related purposes.
Even if the fission offshoots become aware of the process which resulted
in their own creation, that in itself will not help the situation much. Those
fission offshoots who happen to be hairy would probably dismiss the desire,
because it is irrelevant in a peculiar way: it is a desire to have hair on the
earlier head, not the current one. For the fission offshoots who happen to be
bald, the inherited desire would still seem to be the wrong desire to have, for
if they have a desire for more hair, that would be because of their belief
‘This head has little hair’, not because of a belief they inherited from their
fission ancestor, which is about a different head.
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The operation of cognition-based psychological states is equally disrupted
when an indexical belief of the fission ancestor becomes the information
basis of a psychological process in a fission offshoot. As mentioned earlier, in
general, indexical beliefs retained through memory can become the premise
of an inference, or the grounds for file integration. So suppose you say to
me, pointing at a man sitting two tables off from both of us, ‘He is a
financial guru’. If I remember this man, I shall be able to make justified
inferences at a later time, using what you told me (plus what I see through
my own eyes). I could say, for example, ‘So that man sitting two tables
across is a financial guru. He must be a very smart man.’ Suppose I now
learn that this man was Mr X. I am now able to join the dots: ‘So that man
sitting just two tables off from me was Mr X!’. However, the situation
changes drastically when memory is replaced by q-memory (I shall here skip
the case of weak q-memory and focus only on strong q-memory). In the first
place, inferences utilizing indexical beliefs inherited in q-memory are no
longer justified, for the same reason as that for which certain inferences
based on what one has learnt through the descriptions of an eyewitness are
not justified. Suppose you are sitting on the wall keeping look-out, and you
blurt out as you spot a person coming down the street ‘What a scrawny man
this is!’. I cannot see the man, but suppose I say to you ‘Then he [or “this
man”] cannot have eaten for a long time, or he must have some kind of
illness’. What I say would be inappropriate if I intended to use it referen-
tially (since there would be nothing for me to be directly referring to). What
I said could be appropriate only when the ‘he’ is used attributively, as
meaning ‘the man you are looking at’ (or ‘whoever it is that you are looking
at’). My situation is not improved one bit if you, while on the wall, were to
start to give me descriptions of ‘that scrawny man’, like ‘He is F; he is G; ...’,
and if I were then to attempt to make use of ‘he’ or ‘that skinny man’
referentially, based on your vivid description.
The situation of strong q-rememberers resembles the case I have just de-
scribed, in that q-rememberers merely inherit their q-memories from
someone else. They are in no position either to use the indexical terms
referentially in self-ascription or to communicate to others what they appear
to remember, nor are they entitled to say, upon learning more information,
such as the names of people they q-remember, ‘So that man was Mr X!’ (or
‘So he was Mr X!’). It would of course be an entirely different matter if a
q-rememberer merely uses the referential term as a disguised description. In
that case, the q-rememberer’s use of a referential term such as ‘that man’
presents no problem, since it is used attributively only.
This brief survey of information-consuming processes provides a stark
picture of the disruption which introduction of q-states can cause for the
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proper functioning of processes that typically make use of indexical beliefs. If
discontinuity of indexical belief due to q-perception and q-memory is a form
of psychological discontinuity, this disruption represents an equally if not
more severe form of psychological discontinuity.
VI. INDEXICAL BELIEF AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY:
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Philosophers who find the notion of psychological continuity interesting do
so because they believe that the Lockean claim is basically correct. But as I
have shown in this paper, the B-relation between indexical psychological
properties and their bearers can only take a one–one form. To put it differ-
ently, indexical states cannot survive physical discontinuity.
This conclusion has significant implications for the debate about personal
identity. In particular, it shows that the Lockean’s belief that there are
certain psychological properties upon which the position could always rely
for its notion of psychological continuity is largely illusory. We can be more
specific about what is not available to the Lockean. In particular, the follow-
ing are generally unavailable. First, psychological states the ascription of
which makes use of the first-person pronoun. Bodily awareness such
as proprioception, kinaesthetic sensation, pain, and the more ‘cogito-like’
types of mental states such as ‘I remember ...’, ‘I judge ...’, etc., are good
examples. Secondly, psychological states with temporal demonstrative con-
tent are unavailable (e.g., the state I am in when I think thoughts such as
‘It’s now Monday’, ‘Today is a nice day’, etc.). Thirdly, psychological states
with spatial demonstrative content are unavailable (e.g., the state I am in
when I think the thoughts ‘It’s hot here’, ‘It looks foggy over there’, etc.).
Finally, demonstrative mental states whose content directly involves, or is
about, material objects are unavailable (e.g., the psychological state I am in
when I think the thoughts ‘This ball is too bouncy’, or ‘I like this guy!’).
How serious is the damage to the Lockean approach to the issue of
personal identity, which critically relies upon the availability of a suitable
notion of psychological continuity? The extent of the damage is best ap-
preciated through a look at what might still remain available to a Lockean.
Here are some possibilities not ruled out by the argument of this paper:
dispositional psychological properties which have no intentional content
(e.g., personality traits), psychological states whose content features proper
names (e.g., ‘It rains a lot in the Adirondacks’, ‘Mark Twain had nightmares
on his visit to India’, etc.), psychological properties with descriptive (or
general) content (e.g., beliefs such as ‘A tall spy is a spy’, ‘There was a
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departmental meeting at : pm on  April ’, ‘The : pm train goes
to Baltimore’), and desires, such as ‘Not everyone wants to live forever’, ‘All
desire fame’, ‘You would not want to drink moonshine if you had a good
Bourbon’.
The problem with this list is clear: a notion of psychological continuity
built with any of these is unable to do the job the Lockean requires it to do.
For suppose we construct a notion of psychological continuity featuring
contentless dispositional psychological properties (type one above). Clearly,
this notion, if used as a criterion of personal identity, fails to do the job, since
it is unable to distinguish persons from non-persons. After all, such dis-
positions are shared by both humans and many non-human animal species.
On the other hand, a notion of psychological continuity built with psycho-
logical properties with descriptive content provides the Lockean with a
notion of psychological continuity suitable only for judging the identity over
time of either an all-knowing being, such as God (whose omniscience
renders indexical thoughts superfluous), or a creature with the capacity to
think only eternally true/false thoughts. In both cases, the notion of psycho-
logical continuity is ill suited for the purpose of judging the identity of
persons.8
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8 I would like to thank Judy Crane of Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville and my
colleagues Fred Zammiello and Robert Halliday at Utica College for reading an earlier
version; I have greatly benefited from their comments. I am also indebted to an anonymous
referee for constructive and detailed comments, which helped me to streamline the general
argument, and in particular the section on memory’s role in belief retention.
